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Since 2015, Zika virus (ZIKV) has spread throughout 
Latin and Central America. This emerging infectious 
disease has been causing considerable public health 
concern because of severe neurological complications, 
especially in newborns after congenital infections. In 
July 2016, the first outbreak in the continental United 
States was identified in the Wynwood neighbourhood 
of Miami-Dade County, Florida. In this work, we inves-
tigated transmission dynamics using a mathematical 
model calibrated to observed data on mosquito abun-
dance and symptomatic human infections. We found 
that, although ZIKV transmission was detected in July 
2016, the first importation may have occurred between 
March and mid-April. The estimated highest value for 
R0 was 2.73 (95% confidence interval (CI): 1.65–4.17); 
the attack rate was 14% (95% CI: 5.6–27.4%), with 15 
(95% CI: 6–29) pregnant women involved and a 12% 
probability of infected blood donations. Vector control 
avoided 60% of potential infections. According to our 
results, it is likely that further ZIKV outbreaks identi-
fied in other areas of Miami-Dade County were seeded 
by commuters to Wynwood rather than by additional 
importation from international travellers. Our study 
can help prepare future outbreak-related interventions 
in European areas where competent mosquitoes for 
ZIKV transmission are already established.
Introduction
Zika virus (ZIKV) has recently emerged as a significant 
threat to public health worldwide. Transmission of ZIKV 
to humans is thought to occur mainly via bites of Aedes 
aegypti mosquitoes; however, other mosquito spe-
cies, such as Ae. albopictus, have been demonstrated 
as potential vectors [1,2], and other routes of infec-
tion are possible, including sexual transmission [3], 
blood transfusion [4] and vertical transmission in both 
humans [5] and mosquitoes [6]. Although infection is 
usually asymptomatic or mild [7], a causal link with 
congenital birth defects has been established, and a 
strong association exists with Guillain-Barré syndrome 
[8], a severe neurological condition. The low frequency 
of severe complications has been counterbalanced by 
a rapid geographic spread of the virus, which led the 
World Health Organization to declare a public health 
emergency of international concern (PHEIC) from 1 
February to 18 November 2016. ZIKV was originally 
identified in Africa in 1947 [9], but the first large out-
break was not reported before 2007 in Micronesia 
[9], followed by further outbreaks in 2013 and 2014 in 
French Polynesia [10] and other Pacific Islands [7]. After 
the first cases were notified in Brazil in March 2015, 
ZIKV spread throughout South and Central America, 
with the notable exception of Uruguay and continental 
Chile, within 18 months [11,43].
In Europe, locally transmitted cases of ZIKV have not 
occurred to date. Ae. aegypti is currently present only 
on Madeira (Portugal) and around the Black Sea [12]; 
the much more widespread Ae. albopictus has a similar 
competence for ZIKV at 27°C, but none at 18 °C [2]. For 
these reasons, the risk of local transmission in temper-
ate climate regions has been estimated to be minor 
[13,14], but the possibility of outbreaks transmitted by 
Ae. albopictus cannot be ruled out in warmer areas, 
allowing both greater vector densities and higher com-
petence. Indeed, 11% of the European population is 
estimated to live in areas suitable for a ZIKV epidemic, 
mostly concentrated in the Mediterranean basin [14].
In the continental United States (US), the first out-
break of ZIKV was recorded at the end of July 2016 in 
the Wynwood neighbourhood of Miami-Dade County, 
Florida [15]. In mid-August, mid-September and mid-
October, three additional outbreaks in other areas of 
the same county (South Miami Beach, North Miami 
Beach and Little River) were identified. On 9 December 
2016, the Florida Department of Health declared to 
have cleared active ZIKV transmission from all iden-
tified areas, which counted ca 250 locally acquired 
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infections overall [16], and the area has been Zika-free 
since then.
In this work, we analysed the transmission dynamics 
of the Wynwood outbreak using a mathematical model 
calibrated to outbreak data, and we assessed the effi-
cacy of the implemented vector control measures in 
containing viral transmission. Results from this analy-
sis provide useful insights for prevention and control of 
possible future outbreaks in European areas.
Methods
The outbreak under study involved an area of approxi-
mately 2.6 km2 [15], with a population of 7,725 inhab-
itants [17]. Health authorities identified 21 locally 
transmitted symptomatic cases, with onset of illness 
ranging from 26 June to 5 August 2016.
We modelled the mosquito abundance over time M(t) 
by considering a fixed mortality rate μ and a time-
dependent recruitment rate ψ(t) (defined as the aver-
age number of adult female mosquitoes produced by 
a single female adult) previously estimated on Ae. 
aegypti populations from Miami [18]. A density D of ca 
1,560 female mosquitoes per hectare was estimated on 
t = 26 July, before vector control treatments [15], in the 
following equation, using parameter values reported in 
Table 1: D = K/aπr2.
We modelled the mosquito abundance over time M(t) by 
considering a fixed mortality rate μM, a time-depend-
ent recruitment rate ψ(t) previously estimated on Ae. 
aegypti populations from Miami [18] and their density 
D. Specifically, we applied the following system to com-
pute the mosquito abundance on each day t:
We modelled the interventions by imposing a sudden 
decrease of the mosquito population size by ρ = 75% 
after 6 August, as suggested by the entomological data 
presented in [15] (Figure 1, panel A).
Transmission dynamics of ZIKV in humans and mos-
quitoes were modelled according to the compartmen-
tal scheme reported in Figure 1, panel B. Susceptible 
humans (S) contract ZIKV from bites of infectious mos-
quitoes. A fraction q of infected individuals will remain 
asymptomatic (A) for the entire duration of viraemic 
infection ti, after which they will recover (R); the remain-
ing fraction (1 − q) will remain temporarily asympto-
matic (I) before developing symptoms (C) and will then 
recover (R). Recovered individuals are no longer infec-
tious and become immune to reinfections. We assumed 
that infected humans (Hi) are infectious regardless of 
apparent clinical symptoms. Symptomatic individu-
als have an overall probability d of being detected at 
some point. Susceptible mosquitoes (Ms) can become 
infected (Me) after biting infectious humans; in such 
cases, they will become infectious to humans (Mi) after 
an extrinsic incubation period and for the rest of their 
life. Given the very small rates of vertical transmission 
[6], we assumed that all mosquitoes newly emerged 
from their breeding site are susceptible.
To take into account the uncertainty surrounding the 
epidemiological parameters, we ran a stochastic ver-
sion of the model proposed in Figure 1, panel B. We 
implemented an agent-based model representing the 
7,725 inhabitants of the Wynwood neighbourhood, fol-
lowing an approach similar to the one presented in [19]. 
On each day, susceptible humans move to the infec-
tious compartments based on a Poisson sample with a 
rate equal to the force of infection λH; infected humans 
are subject to a binomial probability q of remaining 
asymptomatic. Asymptomatic individuals will remain 
infectious for a time ti sampled from a uniform distri-
bution with a range of 7–13 days; symptomatic indi-
viduals will show their symptoms after a time LH drawn 
from a gamma distribution with a mean of 5.9 days and 
shape parameter 0.5. Symptoms will last until recov-
ery for a time αH, sampled from a normal distribution 
with a mean of 4.5 days and standard deviation 0.75. 
Vector dynamics were implemented as a stochastic 
stage-structured model representing the three possi-
ble epidemiological stages of the vector: susceptible, 
exposed and infected. See Table 1 for details on model 
parameters and the corresponding references for the 
adopted probability distributions.
We assumed that the Wynwood outbreak was initiated 
by a single index case imported in the area via inter-
national travel at time T0. Two free model parameters 
(T0 and the mosquito biting rate b) were estimated by 
fitting the model-predicted weekly number of reported 
symptomatic cases to the observed cases. We used 
a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach with a 
standard Metropolis–Hastings algorithm with 100,000 
iterations, uniform priors (range for T0: 1 January–20 
June; range for b: 0–1) and a Poisson likelihood. We 
used the parameter values accepted by the algorithm 
as the posterior distributions, which were used to com-
pute model predictions.
We computed the initial reproduction number R0(t) 
from the following formula [20]:
using the posterior distribution of the mosquito biting 
rate b, the modelled mosquito abundance M(t) and the 
epidemiological parameter values for ZIKV (Table 1). 
R₀(t) represents a measure of the invasion potential 
of an infectious host introduced in a fully susceptible 
host population on day t. We also computed the effec-
tive reproduction number Re(t) as the product of R0(t) 
and the fraction of available susceptible individuals in 
the population [21]. Re(t)represents the residual trans-
mission potential of an epidemic as the reservoir of 
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susceptible individuals is depleted by the process of 
infection and recovery.
We also estimated the number of infected pregnant 
women and blood donors based on the model-pre-
dicted prevalence of human infections over time. Data 
on fertility [17] and blood donation [22] rates by age and 
ethnicity were adapted to the demographic structure of 
Miami-Dade County [17]. We considered all blood dona-
tions occurring between T0 and 27 July, when health 
authorities suspended blood collection from the area 
[23].
We evaluated the robustness of the proposed model 
(‘baseline model’) by fitting alternative model struc-
tures after varying some of the key assumptions: (i) 
We considered a broader mosquito flight range r of 
82.5 m [24] in the estimation of the mosquito abun-
dance (model M1); (ii) we assumed a relative reduction 
in mosquito abundance due to the vector control treat-
ments (ρ) as a free model parameter sampled with a 
uniform prior with a range of 0–100% (model M2); (iii) 
we let the mosquito biting rate b vary over time, accord-
ing to the same temporal dependence assumed for the 
recruitment rate [18] (model M3); (iv) we evaluated a 
model where the reporting rate d was a free model 
parameter with a uniform prior of 0–100% (model M4). 
Models were ranked according to the deviance informa-
tion criterion (DIC) [25].
Results
The baseline model was able to reproduce the number 
of cases by date of symptom onset (Figure 2, panel A), 
as reported by health authorities [15]. The arrival of the 
index case was estimated between early March and 
mid-April (average: 18 March; 95% confidence interval 
(CI): 1 March–15 April), approximately corresponding to 
the dates when R0(t) approached the epidemic thresh-
old (average: 28 March; 95% CI: 8 March–22 April). We 
estimated R0 to vary from a minimum of 0.4 (95% CI: 
0.24–0.61) during winter to a maximum of 2.73 (95% 
CI: 1.65–4.17) in mid-June (Figure 2, panel B).
The total estimated number of human infections was 
1,112 (95% CI: 436–2,120), corresponding to an aver-
age attack rate of 14.4% (95% CI: 5.6–27.4%). We 
estimated 15 (95% CI: 6–29) pregnant women to have 
been infected during the outbreak and a probability 
of 12% that at least one infectious individual donated 
blood before 27 July. The low occurrence of viraemic 
blood donors is due to smaller donation rates among 
the Hispanic population [22], the main ethnicity in 
Figure 1
Modelled mosquito abundance and transmission model for Zika virus outbreak, Wynwood, 2016
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A. Predicted mosquito abundance over time in the study area. Black: 75% reduction in mosquito abundance following 6 August due to vector 
control interventions; orange: no vector control implemented.
B. Model flow chart for ZIKV transmission in humans (blue) and mosquitoes (yellow). Compartments: A: permanently asymptomatic humans; 
I: asymptomatic humans who will develop symptoms; C: symptomatic humans; Me: exposed mosquitoes; Mi: infectious mosquitoes; Ms: 
susceptible mosquitoes; R: humans who recovered after symptoms; S: susceptible humans. Parameters: λH and λM are the force of infection 
for humans and mosquitoes respectively and are computed as λH = b pMH Mi/H and λM = b pHM Hi/H, with H being the total human population 
in Wynwood; Ψ(t) is the mosquito recruitment rate, given by Ψ(t) = ψ(t) (Ms + Me + Mi). See Table 1 for parameter values and references.
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Figure 2
Reported cases, R0, and viral prevalence in humans as predicted by the model for Zika virus outbreak, Wynwood, 2016
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A. Predicted weekly number of reported symptomatic cases by date of symptom onset. Red dots represent observations [15] whereas boxplots indicate quantiles of the 
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B. Model estimates of the initial reproductive number for ZIKV in Wynwood over time.
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Miami-Dade [17], and to the low (< 4%) predicted ZIKV 
prevalence until July.
According to data from the American Community 
Survey [26], incoming commuters represent ca 44% 
of the Miami-Dade population; of this proportion, 
the large majority (87%) are within-county commut-
ers, while 13% come from outside the county (mostly 
from the neighbouring Broward County). This would 
correspond to ca 5.7% of infections (13% of 44%), i.e. 
ca 1 in 18, in commuters from outside the county and 
indeed, one of the 21 symptomatic patients reported 
in the outbreak was a commuter from Broward County 
identified via workplace investigation [15]. About 453 
infections occurred in commuters resident in other 
parts of Miami-Dade; for comparison, only 208 travel-
related ZIKV cases were recorded in Miami-Dade as of 
19 September [27].
Vector control strategies were crucial for containing 
virus circulation by rapidly abating the average value 
of Re from 1.49 to 0.37, with a sharp reduction of infec-
tion prevalence in both vectors and humans (Figure 2, 
panels C and D). In the absence of interventions, the 
Table 1
Model parameters for Zika virus outbreak, Wynwood, 2016
Parameter Interpretation Value Source
K Female mosquitoes per trap per day before interventions 30 [15]
a Capture rate (%/day) 2.46 [40]
r Flight range for Aedes aegypti (in m) 50 [41]
ρ Reduction in mosquito abundance following treatments (%) 75 [15]
pMH Probability of transmission from mosquito to human per bite 0.214 [1]
pHM Probability of transmission from human to mosquito per bite 0.767 [1]
θM Mosquito incubation period (days)
Gamma distribution 
(μ = 10.5, σ = 0.5) [19]
LH Latency before symptom development (days)
Gamma distribution 
(μ = 5.9, σ = 0.5) [19]
αH Symptomatic period (days)
Normal distribution 
(μ = 4.5, σ = 0.75) [19]
ti Duration of asymptomatic infection (days)
Uniform 
(range 7–13) [42]
q Probability of being asymptomatic 0.8 [4,7]
μM Ae. aegypti death rate (1/days) 0.1 [18]
ψ(t) Ae. aegypti recruitment rate (1/days) μM (1+0.25 cos(2π/365 (t-90.89)) [18]
d Reporting probability for symptomatic individuals 0.1 [19]
T0 Date of index case importation
18 March 
(95% CI: 1 March–15 April) Calibrated
b Mosquito biting rate (1/days) 0.058 (95% CI: 0.055–0.061) Calibrated
CI: confidence interval.
Table 2
Effectiveness of alternative scenarios of vector control interventions on Zika virus infections, Wynwood, 2016
Reduction of mosquito 
abundance (6 August)
Total number of reported symptomatic 
cases Total attack rate
Fraction of prevented infections 
compared with no intervention
n 95% CI % 95%CI %
0% (no intervention) 55 29.5–81.7 33.0 16.7–49.3 0
25% 33.7 17.1–57.8 21.4 10.9–37.4 35.1
50% 26.5 11.4–48.8 17.0 6.2–31.7 51.5
75% 22.6 9.2–42.2 14.4 5.6–27.4 56.4 
90% 21.3 9.7–35.8 11.7 5.4–20.3 64.5
75%a 18.1 9.2–33.2 11.5 5.9–20.8 65.1
CI: confidence interval.
The assumed effectiveness of implemented measures is shown in bold.
a Reduction of mosquito abundance occurring on the same day of outbreak detection (23 July).
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model suggested that Re would have remained above 
the critical threshold until the end of August, resulting 
in 55 (95% CI: 29.5–81.7) reported symptomatic infec-
tions and a total attack rate of 33% (95% CI: 16.7–49.3). 
Thus, according to our model, the implemented inter-
ventions have prevented ca 60% of all potential cases. 
Table 2 shows a sensitivity analysis of the expected 
total number of reported symptomatic cases, attack 
rate, and fraction of prevented infections for alterna-
tive scenarios on the assumed reduction in mosquito 
abundance allowed by the interventions. We estimated 
that even a treatment with low effectiveness, corre-
sponding to a reduction of 25% of the vector popula-
tion, would significantly reduce the expected number 
of infections by almost 40%.
Table 3 shows a summary of results obtained with 
alternative assumptions on the model structure and 
parameter values. While the baseline model had the 
best performance in terms of DIC score, the overall 
qualitative conclusions were robust with respect to 
these variations, with alternative models suggesting 
an even earlier introduction of the virus and a slightly 
higher attack rate. The assumptions of ρ = 75% and 
d = 10% for the baseline model M0 were compliant 
with the estimates computed for models M2 and M4, 
respectively, where these parameters were estimated 
through the MCMC procedure.
Discussion
In this work, we estimated that ZIKV was introduced to 
Wynwood between 3 and 5 months before the recogni-
tion of the outbreak by health authorities at the end 
of July. This long delay is justified because the infec-
tion prevalence in humans was small until June and 
because ZIKV symptomaticity [28] and reporting rates 
were low [19]. Our conclusion is supported by molec-
ular-clock analyses of 32 ZIKV isolates from Florida, 
reported by the collaborative project nextstrain [29,30], 
which suggest that importation occurred between the 
end of February and the end of March. Model simula-
tions indicate a likely extinction of transmission during 
winter even in the absence of interventions; however, 
we propose that undetected infections have occurred 
even after authorities declared the end of the outbreak 
on 19 September [27], given the sustained presence of 
infected mosquitoes. This prediction is consistent with 
the identification of locally transmitted cases in Miami-
Dade as late as 28 December, almost three weeks after 
all active outbreaks in the area had been declared 
over [31]. Finally, our results suggest that the other 
three outbreaks in neighbouring areas of Miami-Dade 
County were probably seeded from Wynwood com-
muters rather than initiated from travel-related cases; 
a phylogenetic analysis of ZIKV isolates [29] supports 
this finding and shows that at most two viral clades 
were circulating in the four Florida outbreaks in 2016.
Our estimate of the mosquito biting rate is in line with 
a recent study that found parity and blood meal fre-
quency to increase with temperature [32]. In particular, 
60% of female mosquitoes were parous at 24 °C and 
took blood meals at an average interval of 11.7 days, 
whereas a parity of 86% and an interval between blood 
meals of 9.8 days were found at 27 °C. These figures 
correspond to a rate between 0.051 and 0.088 bites 
per mosquito per day. We estimated an average bit-
ing rate of 0.058 per mosquito per day throughout the 
period March to September, when the average tem-
perature in Miami is 26.1 °C [33]. Because data on the 
biting rate at lower temperatures was not available, we 
did not include its temperature dependence as a pos-
sible driver of temporal variations in the transmission 
risk; however, the model assuming a seasonal depend-
ency in the biting rate resulted in a similar quality of fit, 
an earlier estimated date of importation and a slightly 
Table 3
Comparison between alternative models, Zika virus outbreak, Wynwood, 2016
Model DIC
Average T0       Average b       
Average 
    attack rate         Average d        Average ρ   
Date 95% CI Days− 1 95% CI % 95% CI % 95% CI % 95% CI
M0: baseline model 36.55 18 Mar 1 Mar–15 Apr 0.05 0.055–0.061 14.4 5.6–27.4 NA NA NA NA
M1: model with 
increased flight 
range
36.84 20 Feb 23 Jan–24 Mar 0.093
0.088–
0.100 17.4 4.1–36.6 NA NA NA NA
M2: model with 
free vector control 
efficacy
36.92 16 Feb 21 Jan–21 Mar 0.058
0.054–
0.061 15.3 4.2–28.0 NA NA 85.4 60.1–99.9
M3: model with time-
dependent biting 
rate
37.20 13 Feb 1 Feb–21 Mar 0.052
0.049–
0.055 16.9 4.2–35.7 NA NA NA NA
M4: model with free 
reporting rate 39.15 10 Mar
10 Feb–3 
Apr 0.057
0.054–
0.060 15.0 4.2–27.3 12.8 10.0–19.7 NA NA
CI: confidence interval; DIC: deviance information criterion; NA: not applicable.
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higher attack rate. Other model parameters may be 
influenced by seasonal variations in temperature, with 
possibly shorter incubation periods (as in the case of 
dengue [34]) and increased transmission rates [2] dur-
ing warmer months. Data for natural history param-
eters of ZIKV are insufficient to factor the temperature 
dependence in our model. Nonetheless, by analogy to 
what we found for the time-dependent biting rate, we 
expect that a further concentration of transmission in 
summer months would increase the estimated attack 
rate and push further back the date of introduction.
We estimated a peak value for R0 of ca 2.7, well within 
the range of other estimates for outbreaks in the Pacific 
and the Americas [14,19,35]. Previously published pre-
dictions for European areas with endemic Ae. albopic-
tus populations also suggest potential values for R0 
below 3 in the large majority of sites [14]. Therefore, 
the Wynwood outbreak is a relevant case study for 
potential future ZIKV transmission in Europe and can 
provide useful insights for prevention and control.
In Wynwood, about two weeks elapsed between rec-
ognition of local transmission on 23 July and a massive 
reduction in captured mosquitoes on 6 August [15]. 
These timely measures were successful in containing 
the attack rate below 15%. Even if effective interven-
tions were immediately deployed on the day when local 
transmission was detected, the attack rate would still 
be above 11%. Because ZIKV is transmitted in a popu-
lation for a long time before detection, reactive control 
measures are insufficient to prevent a large number of 
infections. A more effective approach would require 
the application of preventive measures with the aim 
of keeping R0 below the epidemic threshold. A recent 
study conducted on European Ae. albopictus showed 
that integrated vector control strategies can halve the 
mosquito abundance (and therefore R0) compared with 
sites where no intervention is implemented [36]. This 
reduction would not be sufficient to completely elimi-
nate the risk of local transmission in the most exposed 
areas, but it would greatly limit the time window over 
which an epidemic is possible and, most importantly, 
its potential size, thereby reducing the risk of seeding 
further outbreaks in neighbouring areas. Furthermore, 
preventive control of mosquito populations would 
simultaneously reduce the risks of other mosquito-
borne infections such as chikungunya and dengue [37].
Our conclusions are subject to some unknowns on ZIKV 
epidemiology, such as the role of asymptomatic infec-
tions, sexual transmission and spatial dynamics, along 
with uncertainties in parameter values and possible 
drifts in vector competence following adaptations of 
the viral genome [38]. The implications of this study for 
control are expected to be robust with respect to these 
uncertainties, since they depend on the silent trans-
mission of ZIKV in the early months after importation, 
which is now a well-established trait of this emerging 
infection [39].
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